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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW GROWS UP (MORE OR LESS), AND WHAT
SCIENCE CAN DO TO HELP
by
Carol M Rose·
In this Article, Professor Rose assesses the role ofscience in a maturing
modern environmental law. She describes this maturation process,
beginning in the early 1970s with a first wave of "behavior-based" (BB)
regulations. These regulations constrained the actions ofresource-users,
but generally they put to one side the very difficult task of linking
particular legal constraints to direct impacts on environmental quality.
BB regulations served a useful purpose in cutting back large pollution
sources, but by the 1980s they came under increasing criticism for their
inflexibility, inattentiveness to cost-effectiveness, and failure to confront
small and diffuse sources that could be cumulatively more damaging than
large or obvious sources.
To remedy these and other problems, a now-maturing environmental law
has turned increasingly, although as yet incompletely, to quality-based
(QB) approaches, which attempt to connect regulatory efforts directly to
improvements in environmental quality. However, the newer QB
approaches, including market-based programs, entail much greater
reliance on measurement of the relationship between resource uses and
quality changes. This pattern in turn puts new demands on scientific
knowledge, especially for ways to measure or model (a) small and
scattered sources and their impacts, (b) marginal or cumulative effects of
differing amounts ofthe same kinds ofresource uses, and (c) synergistic
effects among different kinds ofresource uses, particularly in connection
with system-wide regulatory approaches. Policymakers need the
SCientific community to take these seemingly unglamorous but critical
measurement tasks to heart-and also to be tolerant ofthe ways in which
conditions ofuncertainty necessarily affect policy decisions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Sad to say, lawyers and scientists are not always the best of friends. In
courtrooms, lawyers butcher scientific evidence-or at least so say their
critics-hauling up any number of quacks tq expound a\lout the dangers of, say,
celery, or, alternatively, to declaim how safe it really is.' Meanwhile, across the
public square in the legislature, the lawmakers pass laws for all kinds of crazy
reasons, among others because movie stars testify about the dangers of
pesticides.2 Like ordinary citizens; legislators do not have much of an idea
about the difference between a risk that occurs at the rate of one in a million or
one in a trillion. Both just seem very small. But then, when the one-in-a-trillion
risk actually occurs, it seems huge. And so, wham! along comes more
legislation to control it, in what seems to be a typical pattern of legi~lative
overreaction.3 All the same, laWmakersand regulators deserve some sympathy
because they have difficult jobs. They often have to figure out what to do when
they do not have a very clear idea what is .going to happen, or what the danger
zones and safety areas really are. This is true in many areas of legislation, e.g.,
in national defense expenditures or in energy policy; but in environmental areas
the problem of decisionmaking under uncertainty is particularly acute.
Environmental problems may take a long time to develop, and the causes for
those problems may be numerous and inextricably mixed together. Thus, unlike
pharmaceutical regulation, environmental law often does not allow for focused
testing. Indeed, scientific findings about environmental problems sometimes
give no firm answers, or raise as many questions as they provide answers.
1 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM
(1991) (decrying impact on jurors of evidence based on unsound scientific methods). But see
JeffL. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work ofPeter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 183 (1992) (criticizing Huber).
2 Robert W. Hahn, Toward a New Environmental Paradigm, 102 YALE L.J. 1719, 1745
n.147 (1993) (reviewing ALBERT GORE, JR., EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE
HUMAN SPIRIT (1992)) (noting "scare" over pesticide, Alar, enhanced by testimony of actress
Meryl Streep).
3 See generally Paul Slovic, Perception ofRisk, 236 Science 280 (1987) (investigating
differences between scientific and popular perceptions of risks of various eventualities).
Some think, however, that what seem to be cognitive errors may be self-correcting, or at
least evolutionarily useful. See Peter Strahlendorf, Traditional Legal Concepts from an
Evolutionary Perspective, in THE SENSE OF JUSTICE 128, 147 (Roger D. Masters & Margaret
Gruter eds., 1992), cited in Bailey Kuklin, "You Should Have Known Better, " 48 U. KAN. L.
REv. 545, 554 n.28 (2000).
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Meanwhile, the results are a matter of acute political and economic significance
to a great variety of interest groupS.4
In the environmental area, however, legislators and regulators have at least
gotten accustomed to regulating under conditions of ambiguity. In fact, much
has been done, and at least some environmental regulatory ideas are identifiable
as successes or mistakes. It is against this backdrop that we need to consider
how science can interact fruitfully with environmental law.
In the pages that follow, I will devote a considerable amount of attention
to characterizing the "First Wave" of environmental legislation beginning in the
early 1970s, which focused on what I call "behavior-based" strategies. I will
then take up the as-yet-incomplete efforts to shift focus to what I call "quality-
based" approaches, using these characterizations as the frame for the question
of the ways that science might be of assistance.
So, where are we now? Just where are we now with respect to
environmental protective legislation? What is the current state of environmental
law and where are the areas where science can be ofhelp?
II. THE FIRST WAVE: QUALITY-BASED APPROACHES CEDE TO
BEHAVIOR-BASED CONTROLS
It is widely thought that, at least within the domestic United States,
extensive legislation has already tackled many of the major environmental
issues. There are exceptions, of course, notably in the very volatile area of
global climate change. But with respect to many other areas of basic pollution
control and resource conservation, environmental law is a mature area, or at
least a maturing one.
This maturation should not be a surprise to those who have followed
environmental legal scholarship. One of the important early scholarly works on
environmental law, James Krier's and Edmund Ursin's study of air pollution
control in California, argued that environmental law proceeds by a pattern of
"exfoliation"; by this the authors meant a kind of trial and error process in
which legislators try various solutions and shuck off the obvious mistakes.5
And indeed, at least domestically, the KrierfUrsin analysis seems to have been
vindicated. It may be the case that legislators have sometimes overreacted to
perceived environmental crises or have gone off in the wrong directions, but
the "exfoliation" process generally has later brought about some
4 A recent example of the uncertainties and pressures on science is the National
Academy of Science's (NAS) study of perchlorate, a chemical used in solid rocket fuel that
has been linked to infant developmental disorders. After a contentious history pitting the
defense establishment and the White House against environmentalists, the NAS panel
concluded that drinking water can safely include 20 parts per billion (Ppb), as opposed to the
Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) proposed limit of I ppb. Some scientists and
environmentalists complain that the NAS ignored other sources of the chemical. See Peter
Waldman, Pollution from Rocket Fuel, WALL ST. J., Jan. 11,2005, at A3; Peter Waldman,
Pentagon Backs OjJWater-Test Plan, WALL ST. J., June 20,2003, at AS.
5 JAMES E. KRIER & EDMUND URSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY: A CASE ESSAY ON
CALIFORNIA AND THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH MOTOR VEHICLE POLLUTION 1940--1975, at
1-3,12 (1977).
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reconsideration and adjustment, even if these readjustments are also imperfect.
It is the exfoliation process that has matured environmental law-particularly
in comparison to the early heady years and the great wave of legislation in the
early I970s.
The basic problem for environmental law is to constrain and channel
adverse human impacts on natural resources. Obviously, this sentence is packed
with questions: What is adverse to a natural resource? Which impacts are
human? What exactly is a natural resource, or what is nature, for that matter?
But I will operate on the theory that most readers will get the general idea even
without an extensive discussion here of those deeper questions.
Over the years, American environmental law has adopted two basic
approaches to inducing constraints on human uses of resources: the first
approach is to focus on overall environmental quality, while the second is to
focus on environmentally-related behavior on the part of particular actors.
Quality-based (QB) strategies direct their attention directly at the resource
itself, and they aim at maintaining some optimum balance between
consumption and preservation, however fraught the questions may be about the
elements that go into that balance. An example of this approach appears in the
National Ambient Air Quality Standards, which identify a set of major air
pollutants and attempt to set overall air quality standards with respect to each.6
These standards anticipate that some pollutants will get into the air from
various economic activities, but they try to designate amounts that will attain an
overall air quality compatible with health and welfare. Another example of a
QB approach appears in the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act, which set
a total limit on the tons of sulfur dioxide (an acid rain precursor) that can be
emitted by major coal-burning utilities.7 In both examples, the primary object
in view is the quality of the air, not the action or performance of any particular
actor.
By contrast, behavior-based (BB) strategies look to something different:
they focus on regulating the activities or performance of the various
environmental players. Thus, regulations that prohibit the use of certain types
of hunting or fishing gear are BB strategies, and so are requirements that
pollution-emitting entities install end-of-the-pipe pollution control devices,
such as catalytic converters on automobiles or scrubbers on coal-burning
furnaces.
One schooled in philosophy might be tempted to describe these two
different approaches as Utilitarian versus Kantian (or deontological),
respectively, in that the first approach aims at a good outcome, whereas the
second aims at inducing right behavior. Environmental ethicists might regard
BB measures as primary because they might see rightful behavior as the
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408-7409 (2000) (requiring national primary and secondary ambient air
quality standards).
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-76510 (2000) (acid rain deposition control sections). This
subchapter also instituted an emissions trading program. See infra note 33 and
accompanying text.
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touchstone of ethics generally.8 My own view, however, is that as a political
matter, environmental law necessarily must look to quality in the final analysis,
so much so that even controls on behavior are ultimately aimed not at rightful
behavior in itself, but at improvements in environmental quality. This is why,
in practice, BB and QB measures often appear in combination, with BB
controls ultimately aiming at quality improvement. One example of this
phenomenon appears in the history of water pollution control measures.
In this Article, I refer to the burst of new environmental legislation of the
early 1970s as the "First Wave," but in fact that legislative outpouring was
preceded by more tentative efforts to contain harmful impacts on the
environment, and many of the measures in this "pre-history" were QB
strategies. Water pollution control efforts were among these. Even prior to the
Clean Water Act (CWA), the states were supposed to set water quality
standards for different bodies of water. But these QB approaches did not in
fact work very well to improve water quality. The problem was that once the
standards were set, nothing much happened. It was just too hard to connect
deterioration in water quality to any particular responsible party.9
In the First Wave of environmental legislation in the early 1970s,
Congress attempted to solve this kind of problem by shifting the focus to BB
controls. That is, in a variety of areas environmental quality was to be
improved through direct control on the players' actions, without regard to the
(almost unprovable) link between particular actions and quality deterioration.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) was one of the most important of these new pieces of
legislation. Here, Congress determined that the QB approach to air quality
standards had to be buttressed by BB strategies, that is, direct regulation of
polluting activities. The CAA set quality standards at a national level, but
thereafter, when the states figured out ways to meet those standards, they were
required to do so in part by specific limits on polluting activities-i.e.,
emissions limitations on specific sources, a kind of BB approach. lo In addition,
Congress passed a separate set of national BB controls on large industrial
polluters, notably factories and the automobile industry. New factories were
supposed to meet ''New Source Performance Standards" to reduce the amounts
of pollution that they produced. I I Similarly, new automobiles also had to meet
performance standards,12 as did major new sources of hazardous air
8 See MARK SAGOFF, THE ECONOMY OF THE EARTH: PHILOSOPHY, LAW AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 152-56 (1988) (referring to an ethical point of view with apparent reference
to Kantianism); cf Carol M. Rose, Environmental Faust Succumbs to Temptations of
Economic Mephistopheles, or, Value by Any Other Name is Preference, 87 MICH. L. REv.
1631, 1633-35 (1989) (reviewing Sagoff, noting ambiguities of Sagoffs "ethical" position).
9 ROGER W. FINDLEY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 386-87
(2003) (describing water quality standards and their problems prior to 1972 legislation).
10 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 110(a)(2), 1970 U.S.C.CAN.
(84 Stat. 1676) 1954, 1959-60 (codified at 42 U.S.c. § 74l0(a)(2) (2000» (requiring that
state implementation plans include emissions limitations).
1142 U.S.c. § 7411 (2000) (performance standards for new stationary sources).
12 42 U.S.c. § 7521 (2000) (emissions standards for new motor vehicles).
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pollutants. 13 In all cases, the performance or behavior standards were based on
a version of "Best Available Technology"; that is, the polluting entity was
supposed to perform at a level comparable to that of the best technology that
could be applied to the activity, e.g., in the case of autos, tailpipe emission
controls that were technically feasible even ifnot entirely developed. 14
The idea was that these legal requirements to use better technology would
force polluting sources to perform better, and in tum this behavioral
improvement would mean that less "gunk,,15 went into the air, thus making
environmental quality better. It is in that sense that these major new pollution
control laws attempted to use Kantian principles (imposinfi uniform behavioral
standards) to arrive at Utilitarian goods (better air quality). 6
Much the same shift to BB approaches appeared in connection with water
pollution. In 1972, the new Clean Water Act (CWA) slapped behavioral
controls on the big polluters, notably through a technology-based permit s(;stem
to limit polluters' end-of-the-pipe discharges into the nation's waters. 7 For
example, a salmon cannery in Alaska had to meet a technology-based
standard--even though not a terribly sophisticated one-to screen waste fish
parts before dumping them in the sea. 18 To some degree the BB pattern held for
the Endangered Species Act as well, with its stringent restriction on activities
that "take" or otherwise harm endangered animals. 19 Once again, direct
constraints on behavior would presumably help to attain a larger goal of
improved environmental quality, in this case recovery of endangered species.
The BB controls could operate without the cumbersome need to show the effect
of particular actions on overall threats to the species.
In short, then, while behavioral controls, like temperance, can serve a
moral good in their own right, from another perspective those controls can also
have results in view-as in cutting down on the bad things that happen when
too many people get too drunk?O
13 42 U.S.c. § 7412 (2000) (performance standards for major new sources of hazardous
air pollutants).
14 A major case approving "technology-forcing" in principle, though granting a time
reprieve to auto makers for pragmatic reasons, was International Harvester Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615,648,650 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
15 In re CMC Heartland Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1145 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing waste
material subject to environmental cleanup as "gunk").
16 Jon Elster argues that much conventional moral thinking is actually a variant of result-
oriented Kantianism, which he calls "Everyday Kantianism," i.e., doing the right thing so
long as others do too. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 192-95 (1989).
17 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act or CWA), § 301, 33 U.S.c. §
1311 (2000) (technology-based effluent limitations on point sources).
18 Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794,816-18 (9th Cir. 1980).
19 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000); Endangered
Species Act of 1973, § 9, 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (2000) (prohibiting "taking" of endangered fish
or wildlife).
20 The individual moral imperative of BB stanqards continues to exercise an appeal. See
Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv. 83,
92-93.
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III. EMERGING SUCCESSES, EMERGING NEEDS, AND THE RETURN OF
QUALITY CONSIDERAnONS
The First Wave approaches to environmental law clearly had some
success, adding needed muscle to the exercise of setting quality-based goals.
Without that muscle, little would have happened for the usual tragedy-of-the-
commons reasons: even industries that wished to take environmentally friendly
measures might not have done so, fearing that competitors would take the
cheaper route of doing nothing, evading discovery, and ultimately gaining a
competitive advantage. Uniform behavioral controls eliminated this
competitive problem by imposing the same observable requirements on all
relevant players. By the same token, there was a certain logic to another aspect
of the First Wave's controls, that is, concentrating controls at the end of the
pipe. The end of the pipe, or "point source" as it was called, was the place
where pollution control performance. could be measured easily.
Nevertheless, those subject to' these controls (along with their academic
supporters) had a point with some of their complaints. The mantra of all these
complaints was that existing BB controls were costly and inflexible.21 One
version of this complaint was that environmental controls failed to operate
efficiently: uniform BB controls subjected all actors to the same controls
regardless of differences in their compliance costs and regardless of differences
in actual effects on environmental quality.22 For example, Honolulu has fought
a long battle with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to be relieved of
the requirement of secondary treatment of city sewage; why spend the money
on additional purification, the city asks, when a sufficiently long pipe takes the
sewage out into the deep waters and st~ong currents, where the effluent scarcely
matters?23 Similarly, in the Alaska cannery case mentioned above, the
canneries argued that the cost of screening fish remains was very much out of
line with any environmental benefits to the receiving waters that would accrue
from this process, as opposed to the cheaper process of grinding.24
A related version of the "flexibility" problem was that BB regulations lost
sight of cumulative effects. In focusing on individual actors' behavior, BB
measures were inattentive to the fact that even small amounts can add up. To be
sure, each salmon cannery ship might have to do a better job in screening its
fishheads, but this would not help the receiving waters much if ten more
canneries started dumping fishheads. In reality, the issue was not canneries; it
was cars. Each new auto might be performing better individually (at least the
new ones), but as time went by, there were a lot more of them on the road, to
some degree offsetting the BB controls that made every auto perform better
21 Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN.
L. REv. 1333, 1335--40 (1985) (characterizing problems of one-size-fits-all technology-based
regulation).
22 !d. at 1336 (complaining of waste from regulatory failure to account for individual
variations).
23 See Johnny Brannon, City Seeks New Permit for Sand Island Plant, HONOLULU
ADVERTISER, MAY 30,2003, at 7B (describing Honolulu's request for continued exemption).
24 Ass'n of Pac. Fisheries v. EPA, 615 F.2d 794,806 (9th Cir. 1980).
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individually. The problem basically is one of small sources: a lot of small
things add up.
Another "flexibility" complaint focused on the end-of-the-pipe
methodology of early BB regulation. In a famous incident that later became the
centerpiece of an EPA reform effort, testing at an Amoco plant revealed that
more serious benzene pollution was coming from the uncontrolled activities at
a shipping dock than from the heavily-controlled "point sources" in the plant-
and that the former could have been controlled at one-fourth the cost of the
latter.25 The trouble was that pollution from the point sources was easier to
measure and hence to regulate, but in fact the less tractable nonpoint sources
might be a bigger source of troubles. This issue has been especially noticeable
in water pollution, where controls on point sources left more or less untouched
the serious pollution from construction, agriculture, and city streets' runoff-all
"nonpoint" sources that are hard to measure and monitor. Nonpoint sources are
small and inconvenient to regulate, but they not only add up, they can also
interact in various deadly forms.
All these complaints of inflexibility and cost illustrated that our system of
environmental law was already maturing by the end of the 1980's. It made
sense for the First Wave of environmental laws to impose uniform
requirements on point sources because those were quick and dirty measures-
not very fine-tuned, but useful to deal with gross problems. When individual
acts of environmental degradation were indeed numerous and gross, it was
easier and cheaper to pay less attention to individual cost differences, or the
accumulation of small amounts, or the rising cost curve of ever-increasing
regulation of the sources that were easy to find. But by the late 1980's, once
the grossest and most easily monitored problems had been addressed, it became
increasingly less sensible to ignore the smaller and more difficult nonpoint
sources while ratcheting up the regulatory burden on point sources-i.e.
prohibiting smaller and smaller amounts of polluting substances from each and
every pipe without corresponding improvement in environmental quality.26 It
was at this juncture that more attention to individual compliance costs made
sense-and so did a shift of attention to other and now relatively more serious
nonpoint sources of degradation, like agricultural runoff or evaporating fumes,
even though controlling those sources is generally more difficult at the outset.
Notice that this shift of attention was ultimately based on attentiveness to
environmental quality. It was because of quality considerations that we had to
impose behavioral controls in the First Wave, deracinating those controls from
hard-to-prove links between behavior and quality. But it is also because of
25 Caleb Solomon, Clearing the Air: What Really Pollutes? Study ofa Refinery Proves
an Eye-Opener, WALL ST. J., Mar. 29, 1993, at AI. For academic commentary, see, for
example, lB. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of
Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 817 (2003) (using the
Amoco experience as example of need to regulate at the "composite" level rather than that of
individual operations).
26 See, e.g., William F. Pedersen; Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 69, 71-72 (1988) (noting that, as of 1984, more than half of U.S. water pollutants came
from nonpoint sources and calling for regulation that requires attainment of quality
standards).
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quality considerations that, more recently, we have had to go beyond the first
generation's fixation on behavior. To be sure, the first round of BB strategies
has indeed done a great deal for environmental quality, and we should not
forget it. Some scholars continue to think that behavioral controls should be
central to our thinking, in large part because they still think that it is too
difficult to prove a link between behavior and quality.27 Some point out that
even if we are to shift to more flexible approaches, the threatened club of
behavioral regulation can keep the various actors "honest," forcing them to
prove that their planned flexible approaches might perform better than uniform
BB controls.28 Certainly it is not to be expected that behavior-based approaches
will vanish-"do this and don't do that"-but we might expect that newer
generations of environmental laws are increasingly likely to treat these
strictures as default rules, to which exceptions can be made on a regulatory or
even on a contractual basis, ultimately with an eye to environmental quality.
Indeed, the most serious downside to BB strategies may not be that they
are inefficient or inflexible; instead, it may be that they can make us lose focus
on the big picture of environmental quality-the receiving water quality, the
receiving air quality, the total amounts of wildlife and habitat, and all the rest of
environmental quality-related goals.29 As a practical political matter, these
issues of environmental quality, and the efforts and expenditures we are willing
to make to attain different levels of environmental quality, are the things that
really make a difference-more than the way any given environmental actor is
behaving.
Notice that quality considerations were where we started in environmental
thinking, even before the First Wave of federal environmental legislation in the
early 1970s. In a sense, for environmental regulation to grow up has meant
coming back to a qualitative focus and recognizing that even behavioral
controls are not necessarily put in place for their own sake, but rather for the
sake of a larger environmental good.
This shift of focus is as yet incomplete. It is in this context of incomplete
transformation that we need to ask about the ways that science can help
environmental law to grow up. But of course we do not write on a blank slate
here. Environmental law has already moved beyond the First Wave; by 1990,
regulators had already begun to deal with at least some of the issues raised by
earlier legislation. They pinned high hopes on one new approach in particular:
market-based tradeable environmental allowances, or so-called cap-and-trade
programs. But these programs so far have had only fairly limited application.
In the next few pages, I will not make a brief either for or against such trading
27 A consistent proponent of continued reliance primarily on behavioral standards is
Howard Latin. See Howard Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation
ofUniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267,1304
(1985) (arguing that regulatory refonn based on cost and benefit comparisons requires too
much infonnation to be workable); see also Wagner, supra note 20, at 96 (same).
28 Wagner, supra note 20, at 106.
29 See Ackennan & Stewart, supra note 21, at 1353 (faulting behavior-based standards
for deflecting attention to technological methods instead of quality goals).
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programs; instead, I will use them to illuminate the kinds of assistance that our
maturing environmental law needs from science.
IV. THE NEXT WAVE'S GAPS AND NEEDS: THE EXAMPLE OF CAP-AND-
TRADE PROGRAMS
The call for market-based approaches to environmental law began with
complaints about the inflexibility and inefficiency of early uniform BB
approaches, and particularly complaints about those approaches' increasing
marginal costs and decreasing marginal benefits. By the later 1980's, critics of
BB approaches combined their critique with a proposed alternative: cap-and-
trade programs, which seemed especially applicable to efforts to clean ufo sulfur
dioxide, a byproduct of coal-burning plants and a precursor to acid rain. 0
The first step in any cap-and-trade program is of course the cap: that is, the
total usage of some resource is to be capped at an overall amount that is
considered to be compatible with health and welfare. Thereafter, the total
capped amount is divided into units that are convenient for individual resource
users; they can purchase or trade for the number of units that they need at a
price set by market demand.
The initial idea of an upper cap, be it noted, derives from a direct focus on
environmental quality rather than on specific behaviors or activities. Indeed, at
the trading stage, too, cap-and-trade programs are more or less indifferent to
individual behavior. To take the acid rain program as an example, so long as
you do not produce much pollution (Le., consume the clean air resource by
using it as a wastebasket), you do not have to do anything in particular-you do
not need to install scrubbers or coal cleaners or any other particular kind of
pollution reduction methods. Indeed, even if you do produce a lot of pollution,
you do not have to do anything in particular. Cap-and-trade programs require
only that for every unit of resource that you use, you must buy an entitlement-
which is to say, you have to pay for someone else to stop polluting, in an
amount equivalent to your pollution, so that the total capped usage of the air
resource remains the same. But the method by which pollution is diminished is
up to the users and their trading partners.
A system like this meets the demand for flexibility because it allows for
any number ofpollution-reduction methods to be used. Moreover, it encourages
cost-effective pollution control, because it allows those with high costs of
pollution reduction (normally older users with high retrofit costs) to pay to
clean up lower-cost ones, ultimately resulting in better air quality for less
money. In theory, the same kind of cap-and-trade regime can be used for a
great variety of environmental subjects. And indeed, over the last several
years, cap-and-trade regimes have been proposed in quite a variety of areas:
water pollution trading, wetlands trading, fishing quota trading, and in the
30 See, e.g., Ackennan & Stewart, supra note 21, at 1353; T.H. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS
TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING POLLUTION POLICY, 120-22 (1985); Robert W. Hahn
& Gordon L. Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go? An Analysis of EPA's Emissions
Trading Program, 6 YALEJ. ON REG. 109, 110, 114, 127 (1989).
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context of global warming, greenhouse gas trading.31 Some have proposed
trading regimes even for something as delicate as wildlife habitat: a developer
presumably can destroy Habitat A so long as she pays for restoration or
creation of equivalent or better Habitat B.32
But in practice, cap-and-trade regimes have had only a very modest
number of applications. The Acid Rain trading regime of the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments aroused great hopes, but it has seldom been replicated in
other areas-some minor use in water pollution reduction; some fishing quota
trading in New Zealand and Australia, among others; and some anticipatory
d · nh d·' E 33tra es In gree ouse gas re uctlOn In urope.
Why are these seemingly promising mechanisms used so sparingly? There
are many explanations, including a number that refer to the political
entrenchment of established resource users,34 but one major reason is an
unsolved problem. That problem, in capsule form, is measurement, and it takes
a variety of forms.
A. Measuring Amounts
The 1990 Acid Rain program applied only to big coal-burning utilities,
whose emissions were themselves relatively easy to monitor. But this is not the
case for producers of other kinds of air pollution, for example smog precursor
gases: the latter result from large numbers of small and elusive sources, notably
exhaust from autos but also evaporation from gas stations or decay from wood
products, not to speak of flatulence from cows or termites. Water pollution is
especially problematic. Some major polluters can be located easily, particularly
those polluters already classed as point sources-the dye factories, the
bleaching facilities, even the concentrated animal feedlots. But many
discharges cannot be located easily, and hence they may be overlooked entirely
in regul;:ttory systems for water pollution control. Many discharges come from
31 See, e.g., Alan J. Krupnick, Reducing Bay Nutrients: An Economic Perspective, 47
MD. L. REv. 452, 476-79 (1988) (water pollution trades); Lisa A. Wainger et al., Wetland
Value Indicators for Scoring Mitigation Trades, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 413, 414-15 (2001)
(wetland trades); Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996
Sustainable Fisheries Act, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 799, 807 (1997) (fish quota trading); Margaret
Kriz, After Argentina, 30 NAT'L J. 2848, 2851 (1998) (greenhouse gases).
32 David Sohn & Madeline Cohen, From Smokestacks to Species: Extending the
Tradable Permit Approach from Air Pollu~ion to Habitat Conservation, 15 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 405, 411-12 (1996). .
33 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. ILL. L. REv.
275,281-86 (describing survey ofre1ative1y minor uses in U.S.); R. Quentin Grafton et al.,
Private Property and Economic Efficiency: A Study ofa Common-Pool Resource, 43 J.L. &
ECON. 679,682 (2000) (tradable fishing quotas in Canada, New Zealand, Iceland, Australia,
and the Netherlands); Thomas M. Kerr & Richard M. Saines, International Climate Change
and Corporate Action, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 2004, at 51, 53-54 (describing
trades in expected European greenhouse gas markets).
34 Merrill, supra note 33, at 289.
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run-off, i.e., the so-called nonpoint pollutants: sediment from construction,
organic materials, pesticides from farms, and fertilizers from lawns.35
Some commentators have discussed the possibility of instituting trading
regimes for nutrients in water, especially nitrogen-loading substances; these
materials speed the growth of organic matter in the water, reducing available
oxygen and leading to die-offs of other marine life.36 The usual form of the
nutrient-control proposals would pin responsibility on the point sources, i.e.,
those that can be located; and the usual practical measures would ratchet down
the point sources' permit levels but allow those sources to meet the more
stringent standards by finding nonpoint sources and controlling them, instead of
installing more control equipment on the point source itself.37
A major problem with this idea, of course, is that it loads all the
responsibility for cleanup on the point sources, largely because those are the
sources we can identify. In that sense, these new cap-and-trade proposals
replicate the way that First Wave behavior-based controls overloaded
responsibility on point sources, even though, under trading regimes, the point
sources have more flexible options for pollution reduction. But there are other
problems too. Suppose we raise the requirements on a given point source-
say, a sewage treatment plant-and then leave it to the sewage treatment plant
to meet the new standard by finding a farm and cleaning up the farm's organic
runoff. Quite aside from the problem of foisting all the costs on the plant, we
do not know whether the solution actually works. The reason we do not know
is that we do not have good measures of the farm's new and old pollution
levels, and hence we do not know whether the trade matches or not,38
Here, then, is an area where a maturing environmental law really needs
help from science: How can we trace small amounts of gunk coming from
dispersed sources? How can we calibrate the impact of those small amounts in
the relevant receiving waters? To be sure, regulators, economists, and legal
thinkers have come up with the idea of trading regimes to solve some of the
flexibility and efficiency problems of the First Wave of environmental
legislation, but we cannot know whether the trades are really working to
improve quality unless we have good measures of small and diffuse amounts of
the relevant traded materials and good measures or models of their effects on
the receiving media.
Notice that this measurement problem was exactly what drove the First
Wave of environmental legislation toward BB strategies-simply ignoring the
link between particular activities and hard-to-measure quality effects. Now that
the easy-to-find sources have been more or less brought to heel, we are still
35 See Pedersen, supra note 26, at 71 (high percentage of water pollution from nonpoint
sources).
36 Thomas K. Ruppert, Water Quality. Trading and Agricultural Nonpoint Source
Pollution: An Analysis of the Effectiveness and Fairness of the EPA's Policy on Water
Quality Trading, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2--4 (2004) (describing problems of nonpoint
sources, particularly nitrogen and phosphorous loading, and proposals for trades).
37 !d. at 19-20 (describing problems of allocating responsibility to point sources).
38 I d. at 13-14 (noting the problem of measuring nonpoint source reduction effects and
problems of "gaming" the system).
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faced with the same issue that we had earlier, the link between activities and
quality. While much has been done to investigate these links, environmental
policy still very much needs the aid of science for closer measurement,
especially of small and diffuse amounts and their effects on resources.
B. Measuring Interactions
Measuring small quantities of pollutants is not the only arena in which a
new generation of environmental regulation needs help from science. Another
arena is the measurement of interactivities among pollutants. In tum,
measuring interactivity takes at least two distinct forms: first, measuring the
interactions of like substances, and second, measuring the interactivity of unlike
substances or contexts.
It is useful here to compare sulfur dioxide (S02), the major acid rain
precursor that is the subject of the 1990 CAA amendments, with toxic air
pollutants. Interactivity would not seem to be a major problem with S02. This
is because sulfur dioxide basically forms a big soup in the atmosphere. Whether
the emissions come from Place X or Y, from Ohio or Pennsylvania, makes
some difference to downwind states, but not a great deal of difference except in
particular instances. For that reason, trading back and forth has little
significance; if an Indiana plant buys up rights from a Pennsylvania plant, it
will not matter a great deal in Massachusetts, where the soup ultimately comes
down as acid rain!9
But by comparison, the location of toxic air pollutants may matter a great
deal, and hence trading may matter too. A small amount of toxic material may
be quite deadly, and if trades concentrate those materials in a given location, a
serious danger threshold may be crossed there.4o Similarly, trading in water
pollutants may matter too, especially in smaller water bodies. A small amount
of a given pollutant may be tolerable to marine life, but if trading results in a
major shock in a particular location, the result may be a major fishkill.41
These kinds of issues have been labeled "hotspot" problems.42 Hotspots
signal a very simple form of interaction: they represent the interaction of a
given pollutant with the same kind of pollutant in a pattern of rising marginal
damage with increased concentrations. Small amounts of the pollutant may be
harmless, but larger amounts may be dangerous, and even larger amounts may
be deadly. The mirror image problem comes with resource extraction, where
the use entails not an addition to the resource (as in pollution), but rather in
taking something from it (as in mining or timbering). For example, a minor
39 Trades across airsheds do matter, however, if the pollutants are traded from downwind
recipient locations to upwind locations. See James Salzman & J. B. Ruhl, Currencies and the
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REv. 607, 638-40 (2000) (noting
problems of these trades, which they describe generally as "spatial nonfungibililties").
40 Richard Toshiyuki Drury et aI., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los
Angeles' Failed Experiment in Air Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 231, 251
(1999) (criticizing emissions trading that concentrates toxics in low-income neighborhoods).
41 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 39, at 638 (noting failure of nitrogen trading in Long
Island Sound due to concentration at the western end of Sound).
42See, e.g., Drury et aI., supra note 40, at 252.
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amount of groundwater extraction in a given location might not be harmful,
since rain will replenish the loss, but a large extraction might cause the entire
aquifer to collapse.43
Under those circumstances, trading can be highly problematic, because
trading can cause concentrations of resource use in specific locations or
contexts. What environmental regulators need is a system of indexing or
"vintaging" to account for rising marginal costs of a given pollutant or
extraction. The wide discussion of hotspot problems suggests that the indexing
need is widely recognized. Fundamentally, this too is a need for measurement,
and here too, environmental law very much needs help from science. The
measurement issue here is not simply finding small amounts, but rather
tracking the interaction of small amounts of a given substance with other small
amounts of the same substance.
C. Measuring Synergies
The interactions of one pollutant with another of the same kind is a species
of synergy (i.e., twice the concentration of gunk X becomes more than twice as
damaging to a given environmental resource). But other synergies are much
more complex. For example, how do fish react to combinations of different
pollutants in the water? Can they stand a larger volume of chlorine if oxygen
has not been depleted by the discharge of organic wastes? How do they react if
both types of pollutant are in slow streams instead of fast-moving ones, or in
shallow streams as opposed to deep ones? In short, what are the effects of some
amounts of X--even small amounts of X-given the presence of some other
substance Y or context Z? If we do not know and account for those varying
effects, trading a given amount of X from one location to another could be
extremely problematic, because as James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl have
convincingly argued, environmental issues are shot through with
"nonfun,JibiIities" that make supposedly equal trades have very unequal
results.
Here again, as with the tracing of small and diffuse amounts of resource
use, if we do not understand the interactions and synergistic effects among
pollutants or extractive activities, we cannot get very far with trading regimes.
Without measurement and modeling of these synergies and interactions, we
could permit trades that tum into disasters. Lawmakers and policymakers
cannot come up with measures, markers, and models on their own. For this,
they need the assistance of the sciences and a much more intensive effort in the
measuring and modeling endeavors that already engage ecological scientists.
D. Measurement and System-Wide Approaches
The First Wave of environmental law tended to treat environmental issues
in a kind of modem version of the Cartesian method: divide everything into
43 Kenneth A. Hodson, Note, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutionality
ofIntrastate Groundwater Management Programs, 62 TEX. L. REV. 537, 541 (1983).
44 Salzman & Ruhl, supra note 39, at 612-13.
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parts and then attack each part separately. Thus we find the Clean Air Act, the
. 45 46Clean Water Act, the groundwater protectIOns of RCRA and CERCLA,
pesticide control in FIFRA,47 and so forth and so forth, each concentrating on a
different type of pollutant or medium. One unfortunate result has been cross-
media pollution, as, for example, when pollutants "scrubbed" from factory
smokestacks get carted off to the hazardous waste site; once there they must be
kept from polluting the groundwater.48 Since various environmental issues and
media ultimately need to be considered in conjunction, clearly a new generation
of environmental law needs to pay attention to the coordination of
environmental efforts.
In some ways, the calls for system-wide approaches raise questions that
are simply a more complex variant on the other measurement issues: system-
wide approaches are supposed to manage the interactions and synergies among
a whole range of environmental initiatives. One approach to wider
coordination has received a considerable amount of attention: what has been
called "ecosystem management," which generally involves areawide planning
and coordination through public participation and intergovernmental
. 49cooperatIOn.
Less noticed is the fact that cap-and-trade programs could also provide for
system-wide environmental coordination-at least in theory, and the
exploration of that theory is again enlightening about the needs of a maturing
environmental law. The most ambitious imaginable trading programs would
allow the trading of different kinds of resource uses against one another: If A's
new production of widgets releases more carbon monoxide, A might trade her
way out of her cleanup obligations by paying to reduce some amount of B's
sulfur dioxide (or perhaps C's arsenic, or D's chlorofluorocarbons). A will
presumably choose to clean up the pollutant that can be most cheaply
controlled, taking into account a universal index that determines the equivalent
harmfulness of each pollutant by comparison to each of the other pollutants,
and, of course, taking amounts into consideration.
Given such a universal index of relative harms, the "cap" in question
would presumably be a sort of "everything cap," encompassing every kind of
45 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 6921-693ge (2000)
(regulating treatment, transportation, storage and disposal of hazardous waste).
46 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
42 U.S.C §§ 9601-9675 (2000) (providing for emergency response to releases of hazardous
materials).
47 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
48 See, e.g., Uwe M. Erling, Approaches to Integrated Pollution Control in the United
States and the European Union, 15 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. I, 11-12 (2001) (describing the air
pollution and hazardous waste cross-media problem in U.S. law); see also William L.
{ Andreen, Environmental Law and International Assistance: The Challenge ofStrengthening
Environmental Law in the Developing World, 25 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 17, 36 (2000)
(describing U.S. law as taking a "sectoral" approach, with certain practical advantages, and
the disadvantage of inattentiveness to cross-media pollution); cf Ruhl & Salzman, supra
note 25 at 814, n.193 (discussing the cross-media problem but remarking that regulators are
now more aware of it).
49 See, e.g., Symposium, Ecosystem Management: New Departurefor Land and Water,
24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1997).
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environmental resource use and all environmental risks, and allowing all to be
traded against all.50 The idea here is the eminently sensible one of getting the
most for the environmental dollar: that the most dangerous and cheapest-to-
control risks should be cut back first through trades against less dangerous or
more costly ones, and so on in order down the line. Thus, a universal market
would allow the market mechanism to coordinate system-wide environmental
protection, and would do so in a way that maximizes flexibility and minimizes
costs.
There are obviously very sharp policy issues here, of course. If a pesticide
pollutant A causes stomach upsets while pollutant B kills rainbow trout, how
much credit (in the form of more stomach-irritating A) should I get for
reducing some amount of trout-killing B? Should these substances be traded
against each other at all? These kinds of questions suggest some of the limits on
science: it is not at all clear that science can tell us that it is worth it to have
more live fish, even at the cost of more stomach aches-particularly when the
persons interested in the fish may not suffer the stomach aches themselves. But
science could assist in describing the effects of pollutant A and B, so that
policymakers could at least intelligently discuss whether they wanted to make
tradeoffs between A and B, and if so, how those tradeoffs might be calibrated.
And so, here again, policymakers desperately need science. Without that
scientific knowledge, without understanding synergies, interactions, and
tradeoffs, policymakers cannot even begin to make informed decisions about
system-wide management. Notice that this is not just a problem for market-
based approaches. Market approaches make the knowledge problem obvious.
But direct regulatory· or command approaches to system-wide ecosystem
management must face the same kinds of issues. Command systems require
coordination as much as trading systems do, and one cannot have well thought
out coordination without knowledge of synergies and tradeoffs.
In sum, then, the second wave of environmental legislation consciously
foregrounded overall environmental quality, but it grew out of demands for
"flexibility"-·a thinly veiled call for more efficiency and greater attentiveness
t6 the differential costs and benefits of regulation. Cap-and-trade regimes were
one of the chief theoretical advances in attempting to deal with the demands for
flexibility and quality considerations, but cap-and-trade regimes have turned
out to have a much more limited practical reach than some had hoped. One
reason is that cap-and-trade programs have pulled the veil away from a set of
unsolved measurement problems. Without solutions, cap-and-trade simply
cannot work well-but then, neither can more dirigiste regulatory programs,
like ecosystem management. We need adequate measures or models for small
and diffuse sources, for interactions between various amounts coming from
those sources, and for interactions among sources of different types and across
media of different types. If we cannot solve these measurement problems, we
50 See Richard B. Stewart, The Role of the Courts in Risk Management, 16 ENVTL. L.
REp. 10208 (1986) (proposing that courts should facilitate a "risk portfolio" approach, which
would reduce the most dangerous and easily controlled risks first). While this Article was
directed to the. courts, Stewart is very much an advocate of market-based approaches,
presumably on the basis of a "risk portfolio" approach.
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are not going to make much further progress along the road to a more mature
environmental law, one that returns the focus to environmental quality. And
indeed we cannot solve those problems without the help of science. This of
course leads to a further question: Will science help?
V. SCIENCE IN THE NEW WAVE
From one perspective, the answer to the question, "will science help,"
seems obvious. Yes, it will, and in fact it already has. Considerable progress in
measuring and modeling has already been made, spurred by environmental
laws in general and perhaps enhanced by the interest in the use of cap-and-trade
approaches.51 On the other hand, there are many reasons why science tends to
lag in environmental areas. One important reason is that environmental
resources are by their nature diffuse and unowned; because no one in particular
has a property-based concern for such resources, environmental research often
fails to· attract the concentrated attention, funding, and political lobbying that
accrues to more money-making scientific research.52 This systemic problem
may even result in the conscious suppression of environmental scientific
findings by those who find such findings unwelcome.53 Given this structural
problem, it is a tribute to science-and to the policymakers that fund it-that so
much has already been accomplished in environmental research.
A very different kind of reason for a lag concerns the prestige that comes
from different kinds of scientific research. From reading popular or journalistic
descriptions of modern science, one could easily get the impression that
scientific work in general is getting smaller and smaller. The "hot" subjects in
the biological sciences would seem to be studies of ever smaller bits of the
genetic code-DNA, RNA, proteins, and so forth. This trend, if it exists,
would not appear to bode well for the kind of science that will be of most
serious practical use to our maturing environmental law, where the issues are to
devise rather prosaic markers of chemicals and other materials, to test their
characteristics at different concentrations, to learn about their interactions with
other substances, and to model how similar interactions might occur in different
contexts. Nevertheless, one might suspect that even the molecular biologists
might well take a turn toward the synergistic before long, if they have not
already, and to address such questions as, "How does genetic material A
interact with genetic material Band C? How do A, B, and C all interact with
some environmental factor K?,,54
51 Camille V. Otero-Phillips, Comment, What's in the Forecast? A Look at the EPA's
Use of Computer Models in Emissions Trading, 24 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 187,
204-12 (1998) (describing the EPA's computerized air pollution models and their uses).
52 Carol M. Rose, Scientific Innovation and Environmental Protection: Some Ethical
Considerations, 32 ENVTL. L. 755, 759-60 (2002).
53 See Robert R. Kuehn, Suppression of Environmental Science; 30 AM. J.L. & MED.
333,333-34 (2004) (detailing instances).
54 See, e.g., Matt Ridley, The DNA Behind Human Nature: Gene Expression and the
Role of Experience, DEADALUS, Fall 2004, at 89, 90-91, 98 (describing behavioral
consequences of different interactions between genes and nearby "switches" of bases, and
interactions of all with environmental factors); see also Keith Humphreys & Sally Satel,
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A grown-up environmental law definitely needs scientists who are
interested in large-scale issues and the interactions among the parts. Of course,
the biggest picture of all at the moment is the issue of human-induced climate
change. Climate change conferences all over the globe have focused on
reducing human-created carbon dioxide (C02), but there are other global
warming gases as well, and some are more potent greenhouse precursors than
CO2, for example methane. How does the reduction of CO2 from automobile
combustion interact with .the greater amount of methane emitted by termites
that digest construction waste? How do both interact with the deforestation in
some parts of the globe (e.g., Amazonia) and the reforestation in others (e.g.,
New England)? International environmental lawyers would be grateful for even
tentative answers. They would be equally grateful for further research on other
measurement issues: Are there markers through which synergistic or
interdependent activities can be noticed? Are there really keystone species? Are
there other signals that a whole ecosystem requires attention, on an ecosystem-
wide basis? These are very large questions, and a mature environmental law
needs scientific help with them, just so that policymakers can make educated
guesses where to put their efforts, and how efforts in plad: A might affect place
B.
Something else that policymakers need from scientists is tolerance. In a
policy world, decisionmakers have to make up their minds on the basis of very
incomplete information. Scientists, unlike, legislators, do not have to make
decisions while their findings are still in doubt; .but legislatures do. Doing
nothing is a decision too, and-like doing the wrong thing-it can be a decision
that makes environmental problems much worse.
What this means is that policymakers fall back on a number of proxies or
heuristics that people steeped in the sciences would eschew. One such heuristic
is consensus, particularly consensus about information, including scientific
information. Consensus is not necessarily a way to do good science in the first
instance, since it can lead to an undue narrowing of the scope of inquiry. A
classic example is the refusal of the eighteenth century British scientific
academy to take seriously the comparison of timepieces to calculate
longitude-but that is the method that ultimately prevailed.55 But policymakers
are not doing science in the first instance; instead, they are trying to figure out
what to do on the basis of the best information available at any given time. This
is not to say that policymakers should not attempt to get the best scientific
advice they can,56 it is just to say that policymakers may have to act before the
scientific community comes to a definitive conclusion. Take issues of global
warming: Some scientists may not agree that human actions have a significant
Some Gene Research Just Isn't Worth the Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2005, at D5
(comparing genetic to environmental factors in disease and arguing against genetic research
where environmental changes are more effective).
55 DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE: THE TRUE STORY OF A LONE GENIUS WHO SOLVED THE
GREATEST SCIENTIFIC PROBLEM OF HIS TIME (1995).
56 For a survey of the ways that scientific advice to policymakers has been organized,
see Lynn E. Dwyer, Good Science in the Public Interest: A Neutral Source oj Friendly
Facts, 7 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J.ENVTL. L. & POL'y 3, 15 (2000).
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impact on the pattern of global climate change, and in the end their views may
even prevail. But the current consensus among scientists is that human actions
have influenced the pattern of warming, and this fact explains the widespread
view-shared by many scientists-that at a minimum, policymakers need to
consider possible constraints.57 Consensus does not make a scientific answer
right, but policymakers cannot wait until they know they are right. Scientists
need to be tolerant of this unpleasant circumstance of political decisionmaking.
This is why calls for environmental policy based on "good science" can be
disingenuous delaying tactics, equating "good science" with the absence of
doubt; in the face of the many uncertainties about environmental issues, the
relevant science is rarely likely to meet that test.58
Another type of proxy that policymakers use involves extrapolation from
large quantities to small, or from small to large. The small-to-large
extrapolation is widely known; many of us treat our individual experiences as
characteristic of a whole class of phenoma.59 Precisely because so many of us
do this, we are aware of the pattern, and we can guard against its excesses to
some degree. More problematic is the large-to-small extrapolation, but this
kind of extrapolation is especially common in environmental policy. Suppose
that an herbicide causes one of every ten mice to die when administered in
teaspoon-sized doses for a short time. A teaspoon is a lot for a mouse; how
should one extrapolate back to the much smaller doses that a real mouse is
likely to encounter in the real world?6o One answer is to assume that a linear
reduction in dosage brings about a linear reduction in incidence of mortality;
another answer is to take the view that there is some likely threshold at the low
end-that is, that smaller doses are likely to reduce toxicity more than
linearly.61 Among environmental regulators and commentators, there has been
much debate over this dose-response issue (even before extrapolating from
mice to humans). Unfortunately, environmental researchers cannot often run
the "me§amouse" experiments that would give us better answers about low
dosages. 2 But policymakers have to make choices anyway. Some
57 See Patrick Parenteau, Anything Industry Wants: Environmental Policy Under Bush II,
14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 363, 365-71 (2004) (describing scientific consensus on
global warming and criticizing the Administration for manipulating science).
58 Wendy E. Wagner, Congress. Science. and Environmental Policy, 1999 U. ILL. L.
REv. 181,230.
59 See. e.g.. Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of
Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1031, 1071 n.l60 (2004) (describing this logical error as
the "representativeness heuristic," first described by Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Beliefin the Law of Small Numbers. in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 23 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982».
60 Bert P. Krages II, Rats in the Courtroom: The Admissibility ofAnimal Studies in Toxic
Tort Cases, 2 J. ENVTL. L. & LinG. 229, 239-44 (1987) (describing difficulties of scaling).
61 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REv. 1003,
1026-27 (2003) (discussing various dose-response choices and controversies over them).
62 Krages, supra note 60, at 241 n.71 (describing the expense of "megamouse"
experiments); cf. Janet L. McQuaid, Note, Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants
Under the EPA's Final Benzene Rules and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990,70 TEX.
L. REv. 427, 454 n.175 (1991) (describing an actual "megamouse" experiment that still
failed to find a threshold for a toxin).
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commentators believe that the only cautious thing to do is to assume linearity;
others think: it wiser to assume safe thresholds; but neither method is pure
science.63 Pure science under the circumstances is simply not feasible.
Still another proxy that policymakers use is the technique of "minimax,"
that is, choosing a solution that minimizes the maximum trouble.64 Suppose
that the policymaker gets two studies of a toxin, but they suggest radically
different effects on human health. The policymaker might choose to split the
difference between them, even though there is no evidence for the middle
ground.65 The policymaker chooses the middle ground for a different reason: to
minimize the worst mistake.
None of these methods would make scientists happy, but in the policy
world, decisionmakers do not have a lot of options. They are not necessarily
playing fast and loose with science or manipulating data; they may simply be
doing the best they can under circumstances of uncertainty. Where the science
is inconclusive, policymakers have to choose their science on the basis of other
considerations-such as leaving margins of safety, taking cost into account,
minimizing worst-case errors, or all of these.
Moreover, in a mature environmental law, problems of uncertainty are
likely to increase, not decrease. This is because in a mature legal system, the
largest and easiest things have been done, that is, the quick-and-dirty controls.
The problems that are left are simply hard, and despite the exhortations of this
Article for better measures and models, it is not to be expected that scientists
will come up with definitive answers to all, or even many, of them.
But in the meantime, there is something else that science can do for a
mature environmental law. Science can help to make environmental issues
interesting. A mature environmental law is not pretty. It is past the stage of
grand theory and well into the stage of acronyms and statutory sections. It
bristles with code numbers and code names: among the important ones there
are sections 111 and 112 of the CAA, along with section 404 of the CWA;
there are CERCLA, RCRA and EPCRTKA (itself a part of SARA);66 there is
SMCRA67 and FLPMA,68 and TSCA.69 None of this makes the environmental
63 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1026-27 (arguing that linear extrapolation is not
necessarily "precautionary"). Professor Wendy Wagner is a strong proponent of the view
that science is unable to answer many environmental policy questions. See Wagner, supra
note 58, at 230 (arguing that policymakers try too hard to treat policy decisions as science).
64 Sunstein, supra note 61, at 1033-34 (describing the "minimax" principle).
65 For a somewhat similar example, see Bob Davis, What Price Safety? Risk Analysis
Measures Need for Regulation, But It's No Science, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1992, at Al
(describing the OSHA process for proposing cadmium regUlations, given highly varied
experimental results).
66 SARA stands for Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986; its Title
1II includes disclosure requirements officially named the Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 V.S.C.C.A.N. (100 Stat. 1613)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of42 V.S.C.).
67 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328
(2000).
68 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 V.S.c. §§ 1701-1785 (2000).
69 Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 V.S.c. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
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novice happy. She wants to keep the air sparkling, and what she finds are the
PSD70 requirements. She wants to save the whales, and all she gets is the
MMPA.71
On the other hand, environmental science is interesting. The author once
encountered a husband and wife who were both engaged in marine biology;
their major study area was worms that lived in saltwater marsh muds. They had
started with scuba diving and went from the beauties of the reef fish to
mudworms. But after their studies, they were every bit as fascinated by
mudworms. Similarly, one need only see the computer versions of geologic
formations to get a glimpse of the aesthetic pull of geology as a scientific
pursuit.
Policymakers need environmental scientists to talk about this aspect of
their work-that is, about the aesthetic aspects of scientific research. Perhaps
this could help to overcome the structural reasons for the inattentiveness to
environmental issues mentioned above. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act
concerns wetland regulations, but taken alone it will never get many people
interested in wetlands; most people would have to be interested in wetlands
already before they tried to fathom section 404. Indeed, all other things being
equal, those most likely to look at section 404 might well be the property
owners most fearful of the legislation and least inclined to appreciate the
wetlands it protects. But the guts of a mudworm might bring some interest to
wetlands protection, even among affected property owners, and so might the
way that a freshwater mussel opens and closes. Knowing something about
those natural phenomena might get a person to read section 404 with real
interest and a positive attitude. The Kyoto Protocols alone will not get anyone
interested in climate change, but news of a glacier melt might. It is the
scientists who are often the first to know about matters of this sort and to have
access to an aesthetic and dramatic appreciation that can help make people
interested in policy. Those on the policy side need scientists to open the eyes of
the world to this information, so that section 404 and the Kyoto Protocols have
a chance.
VI. CONCLUSION
What, then, does a mature environmental law need from science? This
Article has argued that most centrally, a mature environmental law is likely to
take greater account of the relationships between controls and overall quality;
but to address quality concerns, the law especially needs help with
measurement and modeling. Understood broadly, this includes measurement of
small and diffuse resource changes, interactions, and synergies. The history of
our own environmental law also teaches that in shifting back to quality
concerns, more mature regulatory systems need to become more flexible and
more attentive to costs and benefits. But those goals cannot be reached without
70 42 U.S.c. §§ 7470-7492 (2000) (describing requirements for "prevention of
significant deterioration" in air quality).
71 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.c. §§ 1361-1421 (2000).
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measurement and modeling of the resource uses, and of the effectiveness vel
non of more flexible devices.
Secondarily, a mature environmental law faces even greater uncertainties
as the problems it addresses become less tractable. For this reason, a mature
environmental law needs tolerance from science. This is because, more than
ever, policymakers cannot wait until scientific evidence is conclusive; instead,
they often have to make up their minds while the data is still tentative. Here,
the appropriate criteria to judge policymaking are not just attentiveness to
scientific findings, and certainly not accord with some dreamed-for and settled
"good science," but rather fairness, openmindedness, and transparency-all of
which, after all, are scientific values in themselves.
Finally, a mature environmental law necessarily becomes complicated, not
to say impenetrable. This brings us to a somewhat more subtle way that science
can help environmental law, especially as environmental law matures: science
can engage the interest of ordinary citizens, bringing us to see the beauty and
aesthetic pleasure in the whole intertwining knot of our ecological
surroundings.
